Researchers in general are increasingly urged by governments of rich countries to "have an impact" on public policies (Boswell and Smith 2017). Süsser et al. (2021) suggest that this risks to restrict research to energy futures that can be used by policymakers, and thus exclude potential alternatives. Does that theory hold for EU climate mitigation scenarios? If so, by which means is this restriction enacted?

Controlling questions through funding

This theory is largely supported by my data on EU energy and climate scenarios, mainly because of funding.

The European Commission is the biggest funder for climate research in the EU (Overland and Sovacool 2020), and more specifically the main source of funding for most of the researchers working in energy-economy-environment modelling in Europe. Moreover, the most important institutes in this field (PIK, IIASA, CMCC) have little unconditional funding. The CMCC almost entirely depends on Horizon projects for funding, and it even has dedicated workers to help researchers find and apply to calls (CMCC1).

On an individual level, it is therefore very difficult to have a research career without relying on the Horizon programme. Because of this dependency on projects, many researchers work on temporary contracts (CMCC1, CMCC2), and writing proposals and managing projects often take up most of the working time of senior researchers (KTH1, NTNU1, University1, UU1).

As a result, most of the new research in climate mitigation scenarios is undertaken because a project proposal has been accepted (NTNU1, University1, CMCC1, CMCC2, KTH1, UU1, UV1), simply because it means that you will be able to pay and/or hire people. Horizon calls for projects therefore largely define which questions should be answered in this field (UV1, University1).

Horizon calls are drafted by workers of the directorate-general (DG) for research. They interpret the latest EU policy documents and laws to anticipate what research is needed, and often get feedback from Member States and relevant DGs. This ensures a broad alignment of research with the priorities of the Commission and Member States. Scientific associations and ongoing projects can also be asked which topics should be explored (DG RTD1).

This situation makes researchers try to anticipate the needs of policymakers, which probably helps writing project proposals and doing "policy-relevant" research. The expectations of policymakers in the current political context is therefore one of the most common discussion topics in modelling conferences. Moreover, analysts of the European Commission are given a lot of time and attention in these conferences. For example, moderators rarely stop an ongoing discussion when policymakers are involved (event ECEMF 16/10/24, event ECEMF 17/10/24, event ECEMF 09/04/25), which they would often do for researchers.

Shaping research practices

The European Commission is also actively shaping research practices to meet its own needs.

Fist, the Commission makes sure that it can be represented in each project. Horizon calls often require to have a process to involve "stakeholders" during the project (DG RTD1, CMCC1, KTH1), which policymakers are often part of. Almost all Horizon projects in energy-economy-environment modelling that I know of implied the organization of workshops, the design of online platforms and visually appealing tools, etc. (as illustrated in Fejzic and Usher 2025)

Second, the Commission is unifying the energy modelling community in the EU, with a similar strategy to what it has done with lobbies (Laurens 2015). The scientific associations EFECT and ECEMF have originally been created because the European Commission funded a project for an EU research network. They allow a large number of experts to speak with a unified voice, so that Commission analysts do not have to deal with internal disagreements. This explains why the European Commission would prefer to have one network, which runs regular model intercomparison exercises (KTH1). The European Commission is also involved in the organization of the ECEMP, the annual conference of the ECEMF.

Third, the Commission shapes project timelines and documentary practices so that the research output can be usable. Each project has one or multiple meetings with Commission workers, where researchers present the outputs they deem most relevant (DG RTD1). During ECEMP 2024, analysts of DG CLIMA and ENER provided advice on what they need from researchers for the next year, and how to present results in ways that are convenient for policymakers (event ECEMF 16/10/24). For example, a "policy brief" is a 2-3 pages summary of a paper or project, with simplified results that are deemed especially "policy-relevant". This practice has become widespread in EU-funded projects (event DIAMOND 19/02/25, DG RTD1, UV1, KTH1).

It would therefore seem that the European Commission is in a position to shape which research questions are investigated, and by which means, in order to support its own needs for knowledge and tools. This has very large consequences for research output, the most striking being the homogeneity of scenarios and of the assumptions made in models.

Is this all really "policy-relevant"?

However, many other observations led me to a surprising conclusion. I think that the European Commission does not really benefit from the knowledge and tools produced by the energy-economy-environment modelling community.

First, all of the researchers I have met seem to suffer from the fact that they cannot meet enough policymakers to get feedback on their work, nor involve them in Horizon projects. Actually, researchers seem to be the most commonly involved "stakeholders" (UU1, University1). When they do come to modelling conferences, analysts of the European Commission often leave right after their presentation. This was even the case during ECEMP 2024, a conference meant to be co-organized with the Commission. Because of this, many discussions were then dedicated to how to "attract" more policymakers (event ECEMF 16/10/24, event ECEMF 17/10/24), which influenced the structure of ECEMP 2025.

Second, despite the "policy focus" of this field, very few researchers actually know policymakers, and thus cannot reach out if they need advice or if they want to share some results. The fact that the notion of "policymakers" is being used so often shows that some researchers have a rather vague idea of the different positions in the EU. A junior analyst is very different from a parliamentary, a cabinet member or a chief of unit. Therefore, the idea that researchers get of the needs of the European Commission mostly comes from Horizon calls and their understanding of the current political and geopolitical context.

Third, the Commission does not really need new tools from researchers. It has a very strong internal expertise, and contractors with which they have been working for decades. When they need a new module developed, they can just ask E3M or Cambridge Econometrics (event ECEMF 16/10/24). This long-term collaboration with consultancies has made the models specifically tailored to their needs, with statistical categories that help formulating regulations for the EU (event ECEMF 17/10/24). The Commission's internal expertise is very recognized as well: its statistics and forecasts are considered as some of the most reliable data sources for modellers.

As a result, it seems that the research produced is actually of little use to the European Commission. While many projects claim to create "toolboxes" intended to help policymaking, it is extremely rare that its analysts start using tools initiated in research projects. Moreover, many research papers are by some aspect useless to policymakers. This can be because they use different statistical categories, are difficult to translate in laws (Transport NGO1), or simply because researchers also want to answer questions that they consider more "interesting" (CMCC2, University1).

Silencing dissent from the scientific community

So why does the Commission keep funding all this research, if its workers rarely need it and use it? My main hypothesis is that European Commission research programmes, and the surrounding initiatives, mostly serve to silence dissent in the scientific community. Sure, the Commission does not really need all this new knowledge, and its workers cannot even read one hundredth of it. But imagine that a large part of the research on climate mitigation scenarios showed that the EU policy targets are unfair, unsustainable or unfeasible. Then, it might be harder and harder to argue that the EU complies with international agreements (see for example Spain and European Commission 2023), or that its climate policies are legitimate.

To obtain legitimacy from the scientific community, the European Commission does not need analyses that use the exact same statistical categories as theirs. Nor does it need papers that can be translated into bills. It only needs that the conclusions do not significantly diverge from those of its own scenarios: net zero in 2050 is fair and feasible, electrification and renewables are the most important changes to reduce emissions, the "socio-economic" and "distributional" impacts will be limited, hydrogen and CCS are needed to decarbonize hard-to-abate sectors, etc.

In other words, the role devoted to the scientific community is to make sure that the EU (and every government in the world) can continue lying about climate mitigation, fairness and sustainability. The European Commission is actively shaping the scientific consensus on climate mitigation, by disciplining researchers through funding. This domination is also established through the requirement to involve "stakeholders": since it cannot be done properly, it makes researchers constantly feel like their research is not "policy-relevant".

Bibliography

Boswell, C., & Smith, K. (2017). Rethinking policy ‘impact’: Four models of research-policy relations. Palgrave Communications, 3(1), Article 1. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-017-0042-z

Fejzic, E., & Usher, W. (2025). Stakeholder engagement for co-designing European climate and energy research priorities. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 215, 115574. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2025.115574

Laurens, S. (2015). Les courtiers du capitalisme. Milieux d’affaire et bureaucratie à Bruxelles. Agone.

Overland, I., & Sovacool, B. K. (2020). The misallocation of climate research funding. Energy Research & Social Science, 62, 101349. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.101349

Spain & European Commission. (2023, October 16). Submission by Spain and the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union and Its Member States. UNFCCC. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2023-10/ES-2023-10-17%20EU%20submission%20NDC%20update.pdf

Süsser, D., Ceglarz, A., Gaschnig, H., Stavrakas, V., Flamos, A., Giannakidis, G., & Lilliestam, J. (2021). Model-based policymaking or policy-based modelling? How energy models and energy policy interact. Energy Research & Social Science, 75, 101984. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.101984

Ethnographic sources

Code	Type	Organization or context
CMCC1	Interview	Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change
CMCC2	Interview	Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change
DG RTD1	Interview	European Commission - Directorate-general for research and innovation.
KTH1	Interview	KTH Royal Institute of Technology
NTNU1	Interview	Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Transport NGO1	Interview	Transport NGO
University1	Interview	University
UU1	Interview	University of Utrecht
UV1	Interview	University of Valladolid
event DIAMOND 19/02/25	Observation	DIAMOND Webinar: Stakeholder participation in IAM & Scenarios
event ECEMF 09/04/25	Observation	Electrification: A Feasible Pathway to a Climate-Neutral European Union, ECEMF final event
event ECEMF 16/10/24	Observation	ECEMP 2024, day 1
event ECEMF 17/10/24	Observation	ECEMP 2024, day 2